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Can You Hear Me Now?
Conceptions of Privacy in Section 8
Chris Sewrattan*
INTRODUCTION
Meet Jenny. She’s a 20-year-old woman who lives on her smartphone. If you
were given 10 minutes with Jenny’s phone you would have a pretty good feel for
who she is. You’d be able to see a list of Jenny’s friends through the Facebook
app; Jenny’s dating history through the Tinder app; Jenny’s futile attempts to get
a job through her emails, and Jenny’s relationship with her family through her
text messages. If you went through Jenny’s pictures, you’d see a side of her that
even her family doesn’t know about.
Jenny is a drug dealer. Or, really, her estranged boyfriend is a drug dealer
and Jenny helps him out. The line is a bit blurry. Jenny’s boyfriend is a high-level
cocaine dealer. Jenny buys cocaine from him and sells it at a profit to lower level
dealers. Jenny sometimes takes a picture of the cocaine on her phone. She
coordinates the sale with the BlackBerry messaging app. It is difficult to intercept
these messages. But it is easy if you have Jenny’s phone.
Many people want access to Jenny’s phone. The police want to comb
through the phone to convict the members of the cocaine dealing operation of
which Jenny is a part. Jenny’s estranged boyfriend has been bothered for months
about her use of the Tinder app. He wants to see who she’s talking to. And
Jenny’s mother wants to see what characters her discrete daughter is associating
with.
What privacy should Jenny expect to have over the contents of her phone?
And more importantly, why? Some would assert that Jenny’s phone should enjoy
a right to be left alone, particularly from the prying eyes of the state. Some might
defer the question to Jenny to determine what extent she discloses the contents of
her phone, and to whom. For example, Jenny should be able to message her
boyfriend about a cocaine deal and expect that the police will not be able to read
that message without a warrant. Others would assert the opposite: the contents
of Jenny’s phone should not enjoy any privacy because the full disclosure of
information contained on it is necessary for the efficient operation of society.
Jenny’s boyfriend, in his mind, needs to know if she has another romantic
partner. The police need to know who is dealing cocaine so that they can reduce
illegal trafficking. A final segment of society might be concerned about the
chilling effect of searching Jenny’s phone. Although Jenny commits criminal acts
with her phone, she lives the rest of her life on it as well. In the process of
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messaging her friends, making lists, and taking pictures, Jenny develops her
personality. Such development might be stuttered if Jenny was haunted with the
spectre of the police searching her phone.
This article will examine the different conceptions of privacy that are present
in the jurisprudence of s. 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.1
Section 8 guarantees that everyone has the right against unreasonable search and
seizure. As a constitutional right, the protection covers the privacy relationship
between the state and the individual. It confers privacy over information for
which there exists a reasonable expectation of privacy. The article will analyze a
taxonomy of four privacy conceptions present in the literature and discuss their
presence in s. 8 case law.2 It will then examine two criticisms that arise from the
philosophical foundations of these privacy conceptions and suggest a step for
reform.
Note from the outset that this taxonomy is an analytical tool. The four
conceptions of privacy are interrelated. They are best understood when
considered individually, but always applied in conjunction.
I. THE RIGHT TO BE LET ALONE
(a) The Conception of Privacy
Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis famously articulated this conception of
privacy in their 1890 article ‘‘The Right to Privacy”.3 Privacy is a free standing
right to be let alone based on a notion of one’s ‘‘inviolate personality”:
These considerations lead to the conclusion that the protection
afforded to thoughts, sentiments, and emotions, expressed through
the medium of writing or of the arts, so far as it consists in preventing
publication, is merely an instance of the enforcement of the more
general right of the individual to be let alone. It is like the right not to
be assaulted or beaten, the right not to be imprisoned, the right not to
be maliciously prosecuted, the right not to be defamed.4
To arrive at this conclusion, Warren and Brandeis combed through a number
of precedential cases across a variety of subject matters and found ‘‘privacy
principles” within each. The authors argued that these cases were better
explained by a common principle of privacy protection rather than by the
reasons given by the authoring justices.5 The existence of ‘‘privacy principles”
shows that there has always been a distinct ‘‘right to be let alone” in American
common law. Despite the right’s existence, it had never been articulated
1 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11 [Charter].
2 SeeRichardBBruyer, ‘‘Privacy:AReview andCritique of theLiterature” (2006) 43Alta
L Rev 553—588.
3 SamuelDWarren&LouisDBrandeis, “TheRight to Privacy” (1890) 4Harv LRev 193.
4 Ibid at 205 cited in Bruyer, supra note 1 at para 12.
5 Ibid at 198–214.
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explicitly. In addition, Warren and Brandeis believed that the right to be let alone
is needed as a policy matter to guard against changing social conditions. Those
conditions are still applicable today: ‘‘mass literacy, the rise of a popular press,
the crowded conditions of modern life, and the increased personal sensitivity that
supposedly accompanied higher general standards of education.”6
(b) Application in the Case Law
The right to be let alone frames the procedure for search and seizure
authorized by s. 8 of the Charter. In Hunter v Southam, the Supreme Court of
Canada unanimously held that every individual has the right to be let alone
against unreasonable searches and seizures from the state.7 The state cannot
automatically interfere with a person’s reasonable expectation of privacy. Instead
judicial authorization, where feasible, is a precondition for a valid search or
seizure.8 Although the court’s requirement for judicial authorization has been
attenuated in the 31 years since Hunter v Southam,9 the substance of the decision
remains. Under the present law, warrantless searches are presumptively
unreasonable. The state must rebut this presumption by demonstrating on a
balance of probabilities that a search is authorized by a reasonable law and
conducted in a reasonable manner.10
In Hunter, the court ascribed a prophylactic character to s. 8 of the Charter,
ensuring that its practical application respects the right to be let alone. The
precondition of judicial authorization, where feasible, institutes a system ‘‘to
intercept unjustified searches or seizures before they . . . take place.”11 If this
precondition were not present an individual would be unable to assert their
privacy right until after their privacy was invaded. In the court’s view:
Such a post facto analysis would, however, be seriously at odds with the
purpose of s. 8. That purpose is, as I have said, to protect individuals
from unjustified state intrusions upon their privacy. That purpose
requires a means of preventing unjustified searches before they happen,
not simply of determining, after the fact, whether they ought to have
occurred in the first place. This, in my view, can only be accomplished
by a system of prior authorization, not one of subsequent validation.12
6 Thomas C Grey, ‘‘Langdell’s Orthodoxy” (1983) 45:1 U Pitt L Rev 1 at 32.
7 Hunter v Southam Inc., 1984 CarswellAlta 121, 1984 CarswellAlta 415, [1984] 2 SCR 145
(SCC) [Hunter].
8 Ibid.
9 See e.g. the majority decision in R vMacDonald, 2014 SCC 3, 2014 CarswellNS 16, 2014
CarswellNS 17, [2014] 1 SCR 37 (SCC).
10 R v Collins, 1987 CarswellBC 699, 1987 CarswellBC 94, [1987] 1 SCR 265 (SCC).
11 LorneNeudorf, ‘‘Home InvasionbyRegulation:Truckers andReasonableExpectations
of Privacy under Section 8 of the Charter” (2012) 45 UBC L Rev 551 at para 11.
12 Hunter, supra note 7 at 160 [emphasis in original].
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The court has not embraced the right to be let alone in the classical orthodox
manner. The Charter conferred a new and specific privacy right onto the
Constitution Act, 1982.13 In determining the procedure authorized by s. 8 in
Hunter, the court noted that there is no ‘‘particular historical, political or
philosophic context capable of providing an obvious gloss on the meaning of the
guarantee.”14 Nevertheless, the procedure set out is principled and predictable in
the manner envisioned by classical orthodox legal scholars.
II. CONTROL OVER PERSONAL INFORMATION
(a) The Conception of Privacy
Leading legal theorists of this conception assert that ‘‘privacy is the claim of
individuals, groups, or institutions to determine for themselves when, how, and
to what extent information about them is communicated to others.”15 The locus
is the ability of a person to control information about them. Professor Charles
Fried, a leading scholar on this issue, explains that ‘‘[p]rivacy is not simply an
absence of information about us in the minds of others; rather it is the control we
have over information about ourselves.”16
Privilege captures this conception of privacy. A litigant may wish to disclose
information to their lawyer but not wish for that information to be released to
the general world. Privilege allows an individual to control when, how, and to
what extent information about them is communicated to others by a person to
whom they have disclosed their confidences.17
Privacy as the ‘‘control over information” finds support in multiple
disciplines. Harvard psychologist and philosopher Williams James published
The Principles of Psychology in the same year as Warren and Brandeis’ ‘‘The
Right to Privacy”.18 James posited that by controlling the release of personal
information to others, ‘‘a man has as many social selves as there are individuals
who recognize him and carry an image of him in their mind . . . We do not show
ourselves to our children . . . as to our own masters and employers as to our
intimate friends.”19 Philosophy professor Helen Nissenbaum adds a gloss to this
conception of privacy. According to Nissenbaum, context is essential when
determining to whom private information should be disclosed.20 Reasonable
13 Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c. 11.
14 Hunter, supra note 7 at 155.
15 Alan FWestin, Privacy and Freedom, 1st ed (NewYork: Antheneum, 1967) at 7, cited in
Daniel J Solove, “Conceptualizing Privacy” (2002) 90 Cal L Rev 1087 at 1109—1110
[Solove].
16 Charles Fried, ‘‘Privacy” (1968) 77:3 Yale LJ 475 at 482–483 [Fried], cited in Solove,
supra note 15 at 1110.
17 Fried, ibid at 488.
18 See William James, The Principles of Psychology, vol. 1 (New York: Henry Holt and
Company, 1890).
19 Ibid at 294 [emphasis in original].
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people would condemn the idea of a camera being set up to monitor the activity
an 18-year-old university student in her dorm room. The same people might
agree with the idea of a camera monitoring the activity of a toddler in her
bedroom. For Nissenbaum, ‘‘context includes such things as ‘the nature of the
information in relation to that context; the roles of agents receiving information;
their relationships to information subjects; on what terms the information is
shared by the subject; and the terms of further dissemination.’”21
(b) Application in the Case Law
The Supreme Court has adopted the locus of the ‘‘control over personal
information” conception of privacy: individuals have the ability to control
whether they disclose personal information to the state. In R v Duarte, the police
rented an apartment for a police informant who was working with an undercover
police officer in a drug trafficking investigation.22 Audio-visual recording
equipment was installed in the wall. The police informer and undercover officer
consented ahead of time to recording their conversations in the room. The
accused and two other men attended the room and discussed a cocaine
transaction with the police informant and undercover officer. Unbeknownst to
the accused, the conversation was audio recorded. After the conversation, the
undercover officer made notes about the conversation based on his review of the
audiotape. The accused was charged with conspiracy to import a narcotic. At
trial, he challenged the surreptitious recording of this conversation as a breach of
his s. 8 Charter right. He argued, ostensibly, that although he chose to disclose
information about the conspiracy with the attending parties, he did not choose to
allow that information to be electronically recorded by the state.23
The Supreme Court resoundingly agreed. There is a qualitative difference in
the surreptitious electronic recording by a private citizen and the state:
The reason for this protection is the realization that if the state were
free, at its sole discretion, to make permanent electronic recordings of
our private communications, there would be no meaningful residuum
to our right to live our lives free from surveillance. The very efficacy of
electronic surveillance is such that it has the potential, if left
unregulated, to annihilate any expectation that our communications will
remain private. A society which exposed us, at the whim of the state, to
the risk of having a permanent electronic recording made of our words
20 HelenNissenbaum, ‘‘Privacy asContextual Integrity” 79WashLRev 119 at 155, cited in
Stephen B Wicker, Cellular Convergence and the Death of Privacy (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2013) at 59..
21 Ibid.
22 R v Duarte, [1990] 1 SCR 30, 1990 CarswellOnt 77, 1990 CarswellOnt 986, [1990] 1 SCJ
No. 2, sub nom. R v Sanelli (SCC) [Duarte].
23 The casewas litigatedwith reference to thewarrant provision for this type of surveillance
under what was then s 178.11(2)(a) of the Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c C-46 [Criminal
Code]. For the purpose of this discussion the analysis of that section is not relevant.
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every time we opened our mouths might be superbly equipped to fight
crime, but would be one in which privacy no longer had any meaning.24
For the Supreme Court, the definition of privacy is the ability to control the
disclosure of private information to the state, or at least it is with regard to s. 8 of
the Charter. The court was careful to distinguish, however, between invalid
electronic recordings of communications by the state, which are warrantless and
without the consent of all parties, and the disclosure of information to a member
of the public who then passes that information along to the state. The latter is
not constitutionally protected.25 As the court colourfully noted, ‘‘the Charter is
not meant to protect us against a poor choice of friends.”26 It is also open to the
state to obtain a search warrant under the Criminal Code if it wants to
electronically record a conversation without the consent of all parties.27
In some instances, s. 8 of the Charter will protect against the state
conscripting information about a suspect from a third-party company. R v
Gomboc is an interesting example.28 In Gomboc, the police asked an electricity
company to monitor the accused’s electricity consumption with a digital
recording ammeter (DRA) without a warrant.29 A DRA allows electricity use
to be recorded, and allows disclosure of electricity use patterns closely associated
with marihuana grow operations. The DRA data was obtained by the electricity
company and forwarded to the police. The police used the DRA data along with
its own observations to obtain a search warrant for the accused’s residence. The
warrant’s execution resulted in the finding of a marihuana grow operation in the
accused’s residence.
Seven of the nine justices of the Supreme Court found that the accused’s s. 8
Charter right against unreasonable search and seizure was not violated. A
plurality of the court ruled, however, that absent a reasonable law, the state
could not conscript the electricity company to provide the DRA data relating to
one of its customers. Writing in dissent, Chief Justice McLachlin and Fish J. held
that the accused had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the DRA data. In
their view, when people subscribe for public services they ‘‘do not authorize the
police to conscript the utilities concerned to enter our homes, physically or
electronically, for the purpose of pursuing their criminal investigations without
prior judicial authorization.”30 McLachlin C.J.C. and Fish J. likened the conduct
of the utility employees to undercover police officers.31
24 Supra, note 22 at para. 24 [emphasis added].
25 Ibid at para. 22.
26 Ibid at para. 60.
27 See ibid at para. 50.
28 R v Gomboc, 2010 SCC 55, 2010 CarswellAlta 2269, 2010 CarswellAlta 2270 (SCC)
[Gomboc].
29 Ibid.
30 Ibid at para. 102.
31 Ibid.
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Three other justices agreed in principle. Abella J., writing for herself, Binnie
J. and LeBel J. concurred, that the accused had a reasonable expectation of
privacy over his DRA data.32 However, in their view the provincial legislation
allowed for the disclosure of this information to the state. The legislation allowed
the accused to request confidentiality over his information from the electricity
company, but he declined to do so. If the accused had availed himself of this
option, the police’s conscription of the DRA data would have been in violation
of s. 8 of the Charter. Abella J. was not willing to invoke confidentiality when the
accused had the option under the legislation and declined to do so himself.33
Nevertheless, Abella J.’s analysis is premised on the idea that s. 8 allows a person
to control the disclosure of information that they provide to a third-party
company.
More recently, the Supreme Court affirmed Gomboc and held that
individuals have the right to expect that if they disclose information to a third
party for which there is a reasonable expectation of privacy, then they can
control whether that information is shared with the state.34 If the state wishes to
obtain information from a third party, and there is a reasonable expectation of
privacy over the information, the state must act in accordance with a reasonable
law or obtain a warrant. Accordingly, police officers seeking to link an Internet
Protocol (IP) address to a suspect must now obtain a search warrant to obtain IP
address’ subscriber information, depending on the internet service provider’s
terms of use.35
Section 8 does not allow a person to control the disclosure of information
that they have abandoned. The Supreme Court has held repeatedly that there is
no reasonable expectation of privacy in something that a person ‘‘knowingly
exposes to the public . . . or abandons in a public place.36 For example, there is
no s. 8 privacy interest in garbage located on public land.37 By contrast, there
may be a privacy interest against the state in something that is stolen. In R v Law,
a locked safe containing confidential documents was stolen from the accused.
The police found the safe and decided to scrutinize the documents inside,
resulting in the accused being charged with tax offences. The Supreme Court held
that the accused never acted in a manner inconsistent with the privacy interest in
the information contained in the safe. As a result, the police’s search of the safe
violated s. 8 of the Charter.
32 Ibid.
33 Ibid at para. 81.
34 RvSpencer, 2014 SCC43, 2014 CarswellSask 342, 2014CarswellSask 343 (SCC) at para.
65.
35 Ibid.But seeRvWard, 2012ONCA660, 2012CarswellOnt 12133, 97CR (6th) 377 (CA).
36 R v Tessling, 2004 SCC 67, 2004 CarswellOnt 4351, 2004 CarswellOnt 4352 (SCC) at
para. 40.
37 R v Patrick, 2009 SCC 17, 2009 CarswellAlta 481, 2009 CarswellAlta 482 (SCC).
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The Supreme Court may soon be forced to decide whether a person has a
privacy interest against the state in information disclosed to another private
person. In R v Pelucco,38 the accused arranged through text messages to an
associate, Guray, to sell a kilogram of cocaine. Guray was arrested and the police
seized his cell phone. The accused was eventually arrested through the use of the
information found on Guray’s phone. The police located a one-kilogram brick of
cocaine in the accused’s trunk and more drugs at his residence. The accused
argued that Guray was unlawfully arrested and the search of the text messages
on Guray’s cell phone violated his own right against unreasonable search and
seizure. The Crown argued that since the accused had no control over Guray’s
cell phone he had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the text messages from
him that were recorded on it. The trial judge and majority of the British
Columbia Court of Appeal agreed with the accused. Writing for the majority of
the British Columbia Court of Appeal, Groberman J. found that a sender has a
reasonable expectation that a message will remain private in the hands of its
recipient.39 The accused was reasonable to believe that the police would not
search Guray’s cell phone without authorization.40
This analysis stands in contrast to the American experience. In the United
States there is a line of appellate authority on the Fourth Amendment finding no
reasonable expectation of privacy in email correspondence once it has reached its
intended recipient. For instance, there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in
a letter once it is sent.41 Likewise there is no reasonable expectation of privacy
when an email has reached the intended recipient.42 American jurisprudence
typically confers such an expectation of privacy only when the recipient has a
legal duty of confidentiality toward the sender.43 The dissenting judge in Pelucco
adopted the American line of authority, holding that the accused did not have a
reasonable expectation of privacy in the text messages sent to Guray’s cell phone.
The Ontario Court of Appeal recently disagreed with the majority in Pelucco.
In R v Marakah, the majority of the court held that there is no reasonable
expectation of privacy in a text message sent to another person’s phone.44
Marakah has been appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada. The issue will be
settled in the near future.
38 R v Pelucco, 2015 BCCA 370, 2015 CarswellBC 2386, 327 CCC (3d) 151 (CA) [Pelucco].
39 Ibid at para 68.
40 Ibid at para 68.
41 See ibid at para 110.
42 United States v Lifshitz, 369 F. 3d 137 (USCA, 2d Cir., 2004) at 190.
43 See e.g. U.S. v Knoll, 16 F. 3d 1313 (USCA, 2d Cir., 1994) at 1321.
44 R v Marakah, 2016 ONCA 542, 2016 CarswellOnt 10861, 338 CCC (3d) 269 (CA).
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III. CONCEALMENT OF DISCREDITABLE INFORMATION
(a) The Conception of Privacy
An economic theory of privacy advanced by Richard Posner holds that
privacy is the ‘‘right to conceal material facts about themselves.”45 A claim to
personal privacy is the assertion of a right to withhold discreditable information
as a form of self-interested economic behaviour.46 Directly addressing Warren
and Brandeis’ ‘‘right to be let alone,” Posner suggests that people do not want to
be let alone. Rather, they seek to manipulate society through the ‘‘selective
disclosure of facts about themselves.”47 Privacy is a form of self-interested
economic behaviour through which a person can conceal harmful but true facts
about themselves.48
The selective disclosure of information is inefficient and undesirable. Privacy
ought to allow for full disclosure of information:
An analogy to the world of commerce may help to explain why people
should not — on economic grounds, in any event — have a right to
conceal material facts about themselves. We think it wrong (and
inefficient) that the law should permit a seller in hawking his wares to
make false or incomplete representations as to their quality. But people
‘‘sell” themselves as well as their goods. They profess high standards of
behaviour in order to induce others to engage in social or business
dealings with them from which they derive an advantage but at the
same time they conceal some of the facts that these acquaintances
would find useful in forming an accurate picture of their character.49
The ‘‘control over personal information” conception of privacy is turned on
its head. Posner’s conception of privacy is cynical, and asks that privacy as a
concept is discarded for the sake of social efficiency.50 This has been subject to
considerable criticism. Professor Julie Cohen challenges the conception as
reductive:
On the one hand, the understanding of ownership that applies to, say,
cars or shoes just seems a crabbed and barren way of measuring the
importance of information that describes or reveals personality. But
there is also a strong conviction that ownership as an intellectual
concept doesn’t encompass all of the legally relevant interests that an
informed privacy policy should consider — that framing the privacy
debate in terms of proprietary rights elides something vitally important
45 RichardAPosner, ‘‘Sibley Lecture Series: TheRight to Privacy” (1978) 12GaLRev 393
at 399, cited in Bruyer, supra note 2 at 562.
46 Wicker, supra note 20 at 63.
47 Ibid.
48 Ibid.
49 Posner cited in Bruyer, supra note 2 at 562.
50 Bruyer, supra note 2 at para. 20.
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and conceptually distinct about the interests that the term ‘‘privacy”
denotes.51
As Cornell University Professor Stephen Wicker notes, privacy is ‘‘more of a
natural right, and less like a suitcase of twenty-dollar bills.”52
(b) Application in the Case Law
This conception of privacy has found a place in the debate regarding the
existence of a privacy interest in illegal material. On the one hand, individuals in
possession of illegal material, for example drugs, have asserted a privacy interest
over this material. On the other hand, law enforcement agents and prosecutors
have invoked Posner’s economic theory and asserted that the efficiency of the
justice system requires that a person be prohibited from hiding their criminality
behind a privacy interest.
Posner’s conception of privacy has been disavowed in Canada and accepted
in America. The Supreme Court of Canada has consistently held that evidence
connecting a person to criminality is ‘‘very personal” biographical information
worthy of a privacy interest.53 When determining whether a reasonable
expectation of privacy exists, the issue is framed ‘‘in terms of the privacy of
the area or thing being searched and the potential impact of the search on the
person being searched, not the nature or identity of the concealed items.”54 This
follows from the court’s early adoption of the dictum that s. 8 of the Charter
protects people, not places. The court has never gone so far as to call Posner’s
conception of privacy reductive, but clearly it recognizes the reductive nature of
the logic. In R v Wong, the court held that gamblers who ‘‘retire to a hotel room
and close the door behind them have a reasonable expectation of privacy”
despite engaging in illegal activity once inside.55 Moreover, the court has found a
privacy interest in:
. a home despite the presence of a drug inside;56
. an office despite the existence of incriminating documents;57
. an automobile despite the discovery of incriminating evidence58 or
drugs;59
51 JulieECohen, ‘‘Examined lives: Informational Privacy and the Subject asObject” (2000)
52 Stan L Rev 1373 at 1378, cited in Wicker supra note 20 at 64.
52 Wicker, supra note 20 at 64.
53 Gomboc, supra note 28 at para. 130.
54 Patrick, supra note 37 at para. 32.
55 R v Wong, 1990 CarswellOnt 1008, 1990 CarswellOnt 58, [1990] SCJ No. 118 (SCC) at
para. 20, quoted in Patrick, supra note 37 at para. 32.
56 R v Evans, 1996 CarswellBC 996, 1996 CarswellBC 996F, [1996] 1 SCJ No. 1 (SCC) at
para. 42.
57 Thomson Newspapers Ltd. v Canada (Director of Investigation and Research, Restrictive
Trade Practices Commission), 1990 CarswellOnt 92, 1990 CarswellOnt 991, [1990] SCJ
No. 23.
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. the contents of a duffel bag found in a locker in a bus depot despite the
presence of marihuana;60
. a student’s backpack despite the presence of marihuana;61
. electricity consumption patterns despite their creation through the
cultivation of marihuana.62
The court’s rationale also accounts for practical policing implications.
Denying a privacy interest to criminal material opens the door to after-the-fact
justifications for illegal searches that result in the discovery of contraband. This
has the potential to institutionalize constitutional violations and exacerbate
racial profiling.
IV. CREATION AND PRESERVATION OF PERSONHOOD
(a) The Conception of Privacy
Privacy provides the setting in which a person can define themselves through
trial and error.63 Without privacy a person is less inclined to experiment and
make bad choices.64 Accordingly, privacy is needed to guard against conformity,
ridicule, punishment, and unfavorable decisions. For advocates of this
conception of privacy, privacy is a precondition to personhood and human
dignity:
The man who is compelled to live every minute of his life among others
and whose every need, thought, desire, fancy or gratification is subject
to public scrutiny, has been deprived of his individuality and human
dignity. Such an individual merges with the mass. His opinions, being
public, tend never to be different; his aspirations, being known, tend
always to be conventionally accepted ones; his feelings, being openly
exhibited, tend to lose their quality of unique personal warmth and to
become the feelings of every man. Such a being, although sentient, is
fungible; he is not an individual.65
This conception of privacy is a nuanced synthesis of the right to be let alone
and the ability to control personal information.
58 R vWise, 1992 CarswellOnt 71, 1992CarswellOnt 982, [1992] 1 SCJNo.16 (SCC) at 533.
59 M. (K.) v M. (H.), 1992 CarswellOnt 841, 1992 CarswellOnt 998, [1992] SCJ No. 85
(SCC).
60 R v Buhay, 2003 SCC 30, 2003 CarswellMan 230, 2003 CarswellMan 231 (SCC).
61 R v Brown, 2008 SCC 18, 2008 CarswellAlta 523, 2008 CarswellAlta 524, sub nom. R v
Kang-Brown (SCC).
62 Gomboc, supra note 28.
63 Bruyer, supra note 2 at 566.
64 Ibid at 566–567.
65 Edward J Bloustein, ‘‘Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to Dean
Prosser” (1964) 39 NYUL Rev 962 at 1003, as cited in Bruyer, note 2 at 566.
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Michel Foucault explores the exercise of power over human bodies in
Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison.66 Famously, he discussed Jeremy
Bentham’s concept of the panopticon, the idea that a person knows that they are
constantly visible to observers but never knows when the observers are watching.
It matters not whether the person is actually watched. The knowledge of
permanent visibility is sufficient to foster an internalization of discipline.67 The
internalization of discipline results in a body that is both docile and economically
useful: ‘‘Thus discipline produces subjected and practiced bodies, ‘docile’ bodies.
Discipline increases the forces of the body (in economic terms of utility) and
diminishes these same forces (in political terms of obedience).”68 Privacy can help
to guard against Foucault’s spectre of docility. An individual expecting their
conduct to remain private is more likely to experiment with ideas. An individual
not expecting their conduct to remain private is less likely to experiment. Indeed,
Professor Dawn Schrader, a moral psychologist at Cornell University, has
commented on the impact of surveillance and observation on knowledge
acquisition patterns in children. A child under surveillance is intellectually docile
and less likely to experiment.69
(b) Application in the Case Law
This conception of privacy has been generally endorsed in the case law, but
the courts have divided over its application. Most recently in R v Fearon,70 the
court sharply disagreed on whether the warrantless search of a cell phone
interferes with the creation and preservation of personhood. The majority of the
court held that the search does not interfere with the potentially deep privacy
interest in a cell phone for three reasons.71 First, the search of the cell phone may
be circumscribed to text messages or pictures, though, the court acknowledged,
this may not always be the case. Second, the person being searched will have
already been arrested, giving them a lower expectation of privacy. Third, the
search must be linked to a valid law enforcement objective.
Karakatsanis J. strongly disagreed. Writing for the minority of the court, she
asserted that privacy ‘‘gives us a safe zone in which to explore and develop our
identities and our potential both as individuals and as participants in our
society.”72 Cell phones, as modern day computers, diaries, photo albums, and
more, are important conduits through which personal identities are formed. In
66 Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison (New York: Vintage
Books, 1995).
67 Wicker, supra note 20 at 67.
68 Foucault, supra note 67 at 138, cited in Wicker, supra note 20 at 68.
69 Dawn E Schrader, ‘‘Intellectual Safety, Moral Atmosphere, and Epistemology in
College Classrooms” (2004) 11:2 J Adult Development 87, cited inWicker, supra note 20
at 68.
70 R v Fearon, 2014 SCC 77, 2014 CarswellOnt 17202, 2014 CarswellOnt 17203 (SCC)
[Fearon].
71 Ibid at paras. 54–57.
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addition to being a vehicle for expressing thoughts to the world, cell phones are
spaces in which thoughts can be protected from disclosure:
On our digital devices, we may choose to investigate an idea on the
Internet without wishing to attach ourselves to it. We may take pictures
in the context of an intimate relationship, but not wish that these
pictures be seen by others and redefine our public image. We may
debate controversial ideas through text message or email, but not
intend to commit to the opinions expressed.73
For the minority of the Supreme Court, cell phones could not be searched
without a warrant following an arrest because the act of doing so would interfere
with the ability of individuals to develop their thoughts on their phones in
confidence.74
V. CRITICISMS
The four conceptions of privacy are not mutually exclusive. Indeed, there is
considerable overlap between three of the four. Sharing common elements, all
four conceptions are susceptible to two criticisms.75
First, these conceptions of privacy are based on a notion of intuitionism, an
assumption that people have a common understanding of what privacy is. The
difficulty is that there is no such consensus. Professor James Whitman is a
leading critic of the intuitionist privacy approach:
[T]he typical privacy article rests its case precisely on an appeal to its
reader’s intuitions and anxieties about the evils of privacy violations.
Imagine invasions of your privacy, the argument runs. Do they not
seem like violations of your very personhood? Since violations of
privacy seem intuitively horrible to everybody, the argument continues,
safeguarding privacy must be a legal imperative, just as safeguarding
property or contract is a legal imperative.76
This criticism has plagued the conception of privacy since 1890 when Warren
and Brandeis first articulated the right to be let alone. Those authors premised
the privacy right on the protection of a person’s ‘‘inviolate personality” but never
defined what that personality was. Likewise, the Supreme Court of Canada has
endorsed the ‘‘creation and preservation of personhood” conception of privacy
but divided over its application. The absence of consensus about the underlying
concept of privacy renders each conception of privacy incoherent. A consensus
72 Ibid at para. 112.
73 Ibid at para. 113.
74 Ibid at para. 145.
75 These flaws are drawn from Bruyer, supra note 2.
76 James Q Whitman, “The Two Western Cultures of Privacy: Dignity Versus Liberty”
(2004) 113 Yale LJ 1151 at 1154, quoted in Bruyer, supra note 2 at 570.
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can only reach coherence if and when there is agreement on its underlying
concepts.77
Second, the conceptions of privacy are premised on a notion of liberty.
However, in rights jurisprudence, liberty is a form of licence, which grants
permission to act as one pleases against the state’s wishes.78 As a result, privacy,
like other manifestations of liberty, is balanced against the wishes of the state and
other competing liberty interests. To be sure, there is nothing inherently wrong
with balancing privacy against other interests. But, it is problematic. Balancing
assumes that there is a consensus about the importance of privacy relative to
other state or liberty interests.
VI. CONCLUSION
Remember Jenny? She’s still texting, emailing and Facebook-ing with her
phone — and using it to re-sell cocaine to drug dealers. We can better appreciate
the privacy concerns over Jenny’s phone now. And we know what trappings we
fall into when we assume a consensus of understanding about what constitutes
privacy.
First, the legal orthodoxists, Warren and Brandeis, assert that an individual
has a right to be let alone. This conception of privacy is the basis of the
presumptive requirement for a warrant whenever there is a reasonable
expectation of privacy. Second, there is the assertion that an individual has the
right to control what information is disclosed about them, when, and to whom.
This conception of privacy has been accepted in the case law with an
acknowledgement that it is a difference of kind rather than degree when an
individual discloses information to the public and wishes that it not be
intercepted by the state. Third, Posner asserts that privacy can be a conduit to
nefarious enterprise and should be disregarded for the sake of efficiency. While
this view has found favour in the United States, it has been disavowed in
Canada. Fourth, there is an assertion that privacy is needed to create and
preserve personhood. It guards against conformity, ridicule, punishment, and
unfavorable decisions. This idea has been accepted in the case law but its
application has been the subject of debate between judges.
Disagreement about the application of a conception of privacy in part stems
from two factors. Each conception assumes a consensus about what privacy is
and allows for privacy to be balanced against other state and liberty interests.
There is no consensus about what privacy is nor is there consensus about its
balancing. The result is an inconsistent conception of privacy and an inconsistent
application of the privacy right.
77 Bruyer, supra note 2 at 569.
78 Ibid at 573. at 37.
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